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Abstract
As is well-known, consumers want to accumulate precautionary savings in
the face of income risks when their marginal utility is convex (prudence). In
this paper, we explore the e¤ect of the timing of the resolution of income
uncertainty on savings. An agent faces uncertainty about his income at date
t + 2. What is the e¤ect of being informed that the uncertainty will be re-
solved at date t+ 1 on the consumption at date t? We show that the e¤ect
is positive if and only if marginal utility is convex (prudence), when either
the risk free rate is equal to the rate of pure preference for the present, or
when the utility function is HARA. The intuition is that an early resolution
of uncertainty allows for time-diversifying the risk. It therefore plays a role
similar to a reduction of the income risk, whose e¤ect on savings is negative
under prudence.
JEL Classi…cation: D81, D91 E21
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1 Introduction
Households accumulate precautionary savings in the face of future income
risks. The existing literature has focused the analysis mostly on the relation-
ship between the optimal level of current savings and the size of the future
income risk. In the real world, risks borne by consumers in their life cycle are
also characterized by the timing of their resolution. In this paper, we con-
sider the standard time-additive expected utility model to examine whether
consumers should save more when the resolution of uncertainty occurs later
(or earlier) in their lifetime. For example, it is often the case that one doesn’t
know the amount that one will inherit from one’s parents after their death.
An interesting problem is therefore to determine the e¤ect of a longer life-
time of the parents on the optimal consumption of their children and, more
generally, on the wealth accumulation process in the economy.
On a more technical ground, the recent trend in the life cycle consumption
theory that consists in disentangling permanent and transitory shocks in the
household’s income process provides other examples where our analysis can
be useful. This trend is illustrated for example by Campbell and Mankiw
(1990) and Carroll (1997). When shocks are serially correlated through time,
observing the early realizations of labour incomes may provide information
about future incomes. Some young people may face a large uncertainty
about the productivity of their labour before entering the market, but this
uncertainty may quickly be washed away by the mere observation of their
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actual productivity early in their career. For others, the resolution of the
uncertainty may be slower because their labour productivity may be less
correlated through time. Our results enlighten the relationship between the
speed at which this uncertainty is resolved through time and the optimal
initial consumption.
The introduction of uncertainty into the classical consumption life cycle
model has generated thousands of papers over the last three decades. We
know since Leland (1968) and Drèze and Modigliani (1972) that an increase
in future income risks à la Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970) reduces initial consump-
tion if the marginal utility of consumption is convex. Kimball (1990) coined
the term ”prudence” for this assumption. It is widely recognized as a sen-
sible assumption on consumers’ preferences. Because these models have two
dates, they cannot address questions related to the timing of the resolution of
uncertainty. Skinner (1988), Deaton (1992) and Carroll (1994, 1997) provide
clear expositions of the multi-period theory of life-cycle consumption under
uncertainty. Yet they do not investigate either the question of the temporal
resolution of uncertainty. The only exception is a recent paper by Blundell
and Stoker (1999). Using a three-date framework, they provide approximate
solutions for optimal consumption choices under constant relative risk aver-
sion. Their simulations show that there is more precautionary savings when
the uncertainty is in the middle period than when the uncertainty is in the
distant period. Observe that moving the risk from one period to another has
two di¤erent e¤ects. There is …rst an income e¤ect, since moving incomes
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over time a¤ects their net present value. The second e¤ect comes from the
change in the timing of the resolution of the uncertainty. In this paper, we
focus only on this second e¤ect.
The punchline of this paper is to show that consumers should save less
when an earlier resolution of uncertainty is anticipated. There is a simple in-
tuition for why an early resolution of uncertainty should reduce precautionary
savings. This intuition relies on the notion of ”time-diversi…cation”, or ”self-
insurance”. Risks that are realized earlier can be disseminated over more
periods. Namely, a risk ex a¤ecting wealth that is realized with time horizon
of n periods can be allocated to n consumption risks ex=n. This smoothing
of the shock plays exactly the same role as a diversi…cation device. The
reduction of the risk induces prudent agents to reduce their precautionary
savings. In other terms, when risk is realized early in life, consumers are in
a position to smooth it over their entire lifetime. On the contrary, when risk
is realized during the last period of their life, they will have to absorb each
dollar of loss or gain of the lottery into immediate reduction or increase in
their consumption. It is intuitive that consumers should care more about
such latter risks by saving more.
However, we show that this reasoning holds only when the risk free rate
in the economy equals the rate of pure preference for the present. The prob-
lem becomes much more complex when this assumption is relaxed. This is
easy to understand. When the risk-free rate is just equal to the rate of pure
preference for the present, a full early resolution of the uncertainty induces
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consumers to perfectly smooth their consumption over their remaining life-
time. This yields the time diversi…cation presented above. When we relax
this assumption, perfect consumption smoothing is not optimal anymore,
and the argument cannot be used anymore. We provide a counterexample
to this. Finally, we show that the result is robust when we assume for exam-
ple that the utility function belongs to the HARA class, which includes the
logarithmic, the exponential, the quadratic and the power functions.
The course of the paper is the following. In the next section, we introduce
the model. Section 3 is devoted to the benchmark case where the risk free
rate of the economy equals the rate of pure preference for the present. We
show that positive prudence is necessary and su¢cient for an early resolution
of uncertainty to raise initial consumption. We also show that this result does
not hold when the risk free rate is not equal to the rate of pure preference
for the present. In section 4, we examine the case of a small risk on wealth,
whereas the general necessary and su¢cient condition is extracted in section
5. We also explain why our results di¤er from those of Blundell and Stoker
(1999). The last section concludes.
2 The model
We consider the standard consumption-saving problem with three dates. The
felicity function of the consumer is denoted u(:); and is assumed to be in-
creasing and concave. The discount factor of utility is denoted ¯. The agent
is endowed with a ‡ow of income eyt; t = 1; 2; 3: Only ey3 is uncertain. Let
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R > 0 denote one plus the risk free rate, and ew = R2y1 + Ry2 + ey3 is the
future value of the ‡ow of incomes. In the absence of any early resolution of
uncertainty, the problem of the consumer is written as
c¤1 2 argmaxc1 u(c1) + ¯
½
max
c2
u(c2) + ¯Eu( ew ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2)¾ : (1)
Assuming that u is di¤erentiable, the …rst-order conditions to this program
yield
u0(c¤1) = ¯Ru
0(c¤2) = (¯R)
2Eu0( ew ¡R2c¤1 ¡Rc¤2): (2)
The special case of the cake-eating problem and its applications to non-
renewable resources are obtained when R = 1 : the stock of the resource is
not productive. In this case the problem is to determine the socially e¢cient
rate of extraction when the stock of the resource is uncertain. Since utility is
increasing, we have directly incorporated into the program the fact that the
cake will be completely consumed within the three periods. We also implicitly
assumed that it is never optimal to run the risk of consuming entirely the
cake before date 3. The assumption u(0) = ¡1 is su¢cient to guarantee
that this is the case.
The objective of the paper is to compare the optimal initial consumption
with a late resolution of uncertainty, c¤1; to the optimal initial consumption
c¤¤1 when ew is revealed between date t = 1 and t = 2. In this case of early
resolution of uncertainty, the consumption problem becomes
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c¤¤1 2 argmaxc1 u(c1) + ¯E
½
max
c2
u(c2) + ¯u(ew ¡R2c1 ¡Rc2)¾ : (3)
We can solve this problem by backward induction. For each net future value
z = w ¡R2c1; we obtain c2(z) by solving
u0(c¤¤2 (z)) = ¯Ru
0(z ¡Rc¤¤2 (z)) (4)
for each z: The optimal early consumption is then obtained by solving the
following Euler equation:
u0(c¤¤1 ) = ¯REu
0(c¤¤2 ( ew ¡R2c¤¤1 )): (5)
The intuition suggests that c¤¤1 is larger than c¤1: an earlier resolution of
uncertainty makes the future less problematic, something that should induce
the agent to reduce his precautionary savings. Because problem (3) is concave
in c1, this is the case if and only if
u0(c¤1) ¸ ¯REu0(c¤¤2 ( ew ¡R2c¤1)); (6)
or, equivalently, if and only if
Eu0(c¤¤2 ( ew ¡R2c¤1)) · u0(c¤2): (7)
In short, the expectation of an early resolution of uncertainty increases ini-
tial consumption if and only if it reduces the marginal value of future wealth,
which is given by the expected marginal utility of future optimal consump-
tion.
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3 The benchmark case: ¯R = 1
This problem is easiest to solve in the special case with ¯R = 1; i.e., when
the rate of pure preference for the present is equal to the risk free rate of
the economy. In the cake-eating problem (R = 1), this is the case when the
social planner allocates the same utility weight to the successive generations
(¯ = 1):
When ¯R = 1; we see from condition (4) that with an early resolution
of uncertainty, consumption smoothing is optimal for the last two dates,
c¤¤2 (z) = z ¡Rc¤¤2 (z) = z=(R+ 1). Let
ez¤ = ew ¡R2c¤1 (8)
denote the future wealth net of the future value of initial consumption c¤1: In
the case of a late resolution of uncertainty, the date 2 optimal consumption
is given by
u0(c¤2) = Eu
0(ez¤ ¡Rc¤2): (9)
Thus, the comparative static condition (7) can be rewritten as
Eu0
µ ez¤
R + 1
¶
· u0(c¤2): (10)
Now, observe that
u0(c¤2) =
R
R+ 1
u0(c¤2) +
1
R+ 1
Eu0(ez¤ ¡Rc¤2)
= E
·
R
R+ 1
u0(c¤2) +
1
R+ 1
u0(ez¤ ¡Rc¤2)¸ (11)
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The …rst equality is directly derived from the …rst order condition (9) for c¤2.
The expectation operator at the end is on a weighted sum of marginal utility,
which can itself be interpreted as an expected marginal utility conditional to
ez¤ = z¤. This reinterpretation is a crucial point, as we will see below. Ob-
serve that, if u0 is convex, this conditional expectation satis…es the following
Jensen’s inequality:
R
R + 1
u0(c¤2) +
1
R + 1
u0(z¤ ¡Rc¤2) ¸ u0
µ
z¤
1 +R
¶
: (12)
Taking the expectation with respect to ez¤ directly implies necessary and
su¢cient condition (10). This proves the su¢ciency part of the following
Proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the rate of pure preference for the present is
equal to the risk free rate: ¯R = 1. Then, an earlier resolution of uncertainty
raises initial consumption if and only if the consumer is prudent (u0 convex).
Sketch of the proof of necessity: Suppose that u0 is locally concave around
y. Take R = 1 and ez¤ = 2y + ke"; with Ee" = 0. For k small enough,
c¤2; ez¤=(R + 1) and ez¤ ¡ Rc¤2 are in the neighborhood of y. Using Jensen’s
inequality directly yields the comparative statics condition opposite to (10).¥
This Proposition provides a new de…nition of the concept of prudence
alternative to Kimball (1990) under which an agent is prudent if and only if
adding a zero mean risk to his future income reduces his initial consumption.
It is well known from Leland (1968) that a necessary and su¢cient condition
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for a risk-averse agent to make positive precautionary savings is the convexity
of marginal utility. We showed that the same condition is necessary and
su¢cient for an earlier resolution of uncertainty to yield an increase in initial
consumption, when ¯R = 1. In the following, we establish a simple intuition
for this equivalence. The underlying idea is that information reduces risk. It
thus reduces the need for precautionary savings, under prudence.
An early resolution of uncertainty allows for a better smoothing of risks
over time and thus should increase consumption under prudence. If uncer-
tainty is realized at the intermediary date t = 2, rather than at the last date,
the consumer can ”time diversify” the shock over the last two periods. This
means splitting every dollar of loss or gain in wealth into a …fty cents loss or
gain in consumption at each date. Our interpretation of the concept of time
diversi…cation is as follows.1 The marginal value of wealth after date t = 1
is the discounted value of the expected marginal utility of optimal future
consumption (ec2;ec3). It is given by
Eu0(ec2) + ¯Eu0(ec3) = (1 + ¯)E · 11 + ¯u0(ec2) + ¯1 + ¯u0(ec3)
¸
: (13)
The bracketed term of the right-hand-side of this equality can be interpreted
as the expected marginal utility of a random variable which is distributed
as (c2; (1 + ¯)¡1; c3; ¯(1 + ¯)¡1). For a given state ez¤ = z¤; this random
variable is degenerated at c¤¤2 = c¤¤3 = z¤=(1 + R) with an early resolution
of uncertainty. It takes values c¤2 and z¤ ¡ Rc¤2 when the information is not
1For an exposition of the fallacious interpretations of this concept, see Samuelson
(1963). More details are provided in Gollier (2002).
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revealed before t = 3. The point is that under ¯R = 1; the second ”lottery”
is a mean-preserving spread of the …rst. This implies that under prudence,
the expected – or discounted – marginal utility is increased by this absence
of time diversi…cation, state by state. Taking the expectation with respect to
the states of nature yields the result.
Of course, an upper bound to the optimal initial consumption with a
resolution of the uncertainty in the middle period is the one that would
be optimal without any uncertainty. This is because the value function on
wealth inherits prudence from the utility function on consumption.2
At this stage, it is important to remember that we only considered the
particular case where ¯R = 1. This is a particular case since when ¯R 6= 1
perfect consumption smoothing through time is no more optimal and the
time diversi…cation e¤ect cannot be used without an adaptation.
3.1 A counterexample
Let us consider the following numerical example. First take the utility func-
tion
u(c) =
8<: ¡4 + 3c¡ c
2
2
if c < 2
ln(c¡ 1) if c ¸ 2:
(14)
It yields the following marginal utility function:
u0(c) =
½
3 ¡ c if c < 2
(c¡ 1)¡1 if c ¸ 2: (15)
2With the resolution of uncertainty at the middle period, the problem is to maximize
u(c1) + ¯Ev( ew ¡ Rc1); where v(z) = maxc u(c) + ¯u(z ¡ Rc): It is easy to check that v0
is convex if u0 is convex. See Carroll and Kimball (1996).
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This marginal utility function is decreasing and convex, i.e., the consumer
is risk-averse and prudent. Suppose that the future wealth is distributed as
ew = 8:329+e"; with e" = (¡0:5; 1=2; 0:5; 1=2). Finally, we suppose that R = 1
and ¯ = 4=9. Thus, we cannot use Proposition 1 to determine the e¤ect of
an early resolution of uncertainty on the initial consumption. We solve this
problem numerically. In the economy with a late resolution of uncertainty,
the optimal stochastic consumption path is as follows:
c¤31 = 1:989
Á
c¤1 = 4:351 ¡ c¤2 = 2:489
Â
c¤32 = 0:989
(16)
In the case of an early resolution of uncertainty, the optimal stochastic con-
sumption path is written as
c¤¤21 = 2:771 ¡ c¤¤31 = 1:729
Á
c¤¤1 = 4:329
Â
c¤¤22 = 2:271 ¡ c¤¤32 = 1:229
(17)
We see that c¤¤1 is smaller than c¤1; in spite of positive prudence.
4 The case of small risks when ¯R 6= 1
The previous example has demonstrated that prudence is not su¢cient to sign
the e¤ect of an early resolution of uncertainty for any probability distribution
when ¯R 6= 1. In this section, we derive the necessary and su¢cient condition
that permits to sign this e¤ect when ¯R is arbitrary, but ew is a small risk.
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It will be convenient to de…ne e"; k and z¤ so that
ez¤(k) = z¤ + ke" with Ee" = 0: (18)
The marginal value of wealth before date t = 2 with an early resolution of
uncertainty is denoted
j¤¤(k) ´ Eu0(c¤¤2 (ez¤(k))); (19)
where function c¤¤2 (z) is de…ned by (4). With a late resolution of uncertainty,
the marginal value of wealth before t = 2 equals
j¤(k) = u0(c¤2(k)) = ¯REu0(ez¤(k) ¡Rc¤2(k)); (20)
where c¤2(k) is the optimal consumption at t = 2 when the net wealth at
t = 3 is distributed as ez¤(k).
The early resolution of uncertainty raises initial consumption when the
future risk is small if and only if j¤¤(k) is smaller than j¤(k) in the neighbor-
hood of k = 0. It is easy to check that
j¤¤(0) = j¤(0) = u0(c20); (21)
with c20 = c¤¤2 (z¤) = c¤2(0). Turning to the …rst derivatives, we obtain
@j¤¤
@k
¯¯¯¯
k=0
=
@j¤
@k
¯¯¯¯
k=0
= 0: (22)
Thus, we are forced to examine the second-order e¤ect of risk. After tedious
manipulations, we obtain the following Proposition. It relies on the indexes
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of absolute risk aversion and absolute prudence which are de…ned as
A(c) =
¡u00(c)
u0(c)
and P (c) =
u000(c)
¡u00(c) : (23)
We hereafter assume that these functions exists, i.e., that u is thrice di¤er-
entiable.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the risk on future wealth is small. Then, an
early resolution of uncertainty raises initial consumption if and only if
P (c2) ¡RP (c3) · 2A(c2)A(c3)P (c3); (24)
for any pair (c2; c3) that satis…es the …rst-order condition u0(c2) = ¯Ru0(c3).
Proof: Take c2 = c20 and so c3 = z¤ ¡Rc2: Fully di¤erentiating condition
(19) twice around k = 0 yields
@2j¤¤
@k2
¯¯¯¯
k=0
= ¾2¯R
u00(c2)u000(c3) [A(c2)]2 + ¯Ru00(c3)u000(c2) [A(c3)]2
[A(c2) +RA(c3)]
2 [u00(c2) + ¯R2u00(c3)]
; (25)
where ¾2 is the variance of e". The equivalent manipulation on j¤ yields
@2j¤
@k2
¯¯¯¯
k=0
= ¾2
u00(c2)u000(c3)A(c3)
[A(c2) +RA(c3)] u00(c3)
: (26)
Using …rst-order condition ¯R = u0(c2)=u0(c3); it is easy to check that the
right-hand-side of (25) is smaller than the right-hand-side of (26) if and only
if condition (24) is satis…ed.¥
When ¯R = 1, condition (24) becomes (1 ¡ R)P (c2) · 2P (c2), since
¯R = 1 implies that c2 = c3. Because R > ¡1; this condition is equivalent
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to nonnegative prudence: But this is true only when ¯R = 1: For example,
utility function (14) does not satisfy this condition when ¯R 6= 1 in spite
of nonnegative prudence. Indeed, for ¯R < 1; as in the counterexample, the
rate of pure preference for the present is larger than the interest rate, which
implies that the relevant domain of (c2; c3) is such that c2 ¸ c3. Now, observe
that, for utility function (14), prudence is zero for small c3. Thus, the right-
hand side of inequality (24) is zero in this region, whereas the left-hand-side
is positive, thereby violating the condition.
We can extract from this an intuition for why prudence is not su¢cient
when ¯R is di¤erent from unity. The early resolution of uncertainty al-
lows for transferring part of the risk to the second period. This is a time-
diversi…cation device, which tends to reduce the precautionary saving under
positive prudence. But when ¯R 6= 1; it transfers risk to di¤erent consump-
tion levels. If it happens that the degree of prudence is much larger at date
2 than at date 3 (P (c2) o P (c3)), this risk transfer may generate an in-
crease in the marginal value of wealth, which is measured by the expected
marginal utility of future consumption. This is exactly the way by which we
built the counterexample. Observe that the early resolution of uncertainty
transfers half of the risk from a region where prudence is zero (c3 < 2) to
a region where prudence is positive (c2 > 2). Condition (24) thus puts an
upper bound to the degree of prudence in the region where part of the risk is
transferred thanks to the early resolution of uncertainty. Note also that it is
necessary that the utility function exhibits increasing absolute prudence to
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generate such a counterexample.
5 The general case within ¯R 6= 1
The general problem that we have to solve takes the following form. We want
to guarantee that, for any distribution of the net wealth ez; and for any c2,
the following condition is satis…ed:
¯REu0(ez ¡Rc2) ¡ u0(c2) = 0 ) Eu0(c¤¤2 (ez)) ¡ u0(c2) · 0; (27)
where function c¤¤2 (:) is de…ned in (4). The equality to the left of this con-
dition states that c2 = c¤2 is the optimal consumption at date 2 without
information. The inequality to the right states that the marginal value of
wealth is smaller with information than without information.
Consider a speci…c c2. Using the hyperplane separation theorem, as in
Pratt and Zeckhauser (1986) and Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000), this
condition holds for any ez if and only if there exists a scalar ¸ = ¸(c2) such
that
G(z; c2; ¸) = u0(c¤¤2 (z)) ¡ u0(c2) ¡ ¸ [¯Ru0(z ¡Rc2) ¡ u0(c2)] · 0 (28)
for all z. De…ne bz such that ¯Ru0(bz¡Rc2) = u0(c2). We can interpret bz as the
precautionary equivalent wealth to ez: Observe that, by de…nition, c¤¤2 (bz) = c2.
This implies that G(bz; c2; ¸) = 0: Therefore, in order to guarantee that G is
nonpositive in the neighborhood of z = bz, we need that
0 =
@G
@z
(bz; c2; ¸) = u00(c2)c¤¤02 (bz) ¡ ¸¯Ru00(bz ¡Rc2): (29)
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This allows us to extract the only possible candidate for ¸ that could satisfy
condition (28). Using condition ¯Ru0(bz ¡Rc2) = u0(c2), we get
¸ =
A(c2)
A(bz ¡Rc2)c¤¤02 (bz) = c¤¤03 (bz); (30)
where c¤¤3 (z) = z ¡Rc¤¤2 (z). Indeed, fully di¤erentiating condition (4) yields
c¤¤02 (z) =
A(z ¡Rc¤¤2 (z))
A(c¤¤2 (z)) +RA(c¤¤3 (z))
and c¤¤03 (z) =
A(c¤¤2 (z))
A(c¤¤2 (z)) +RA(c¤¤3 (z))
:
(31)
Notice that conditions (31) determine the optimal allocation of risk ez over
dates t = 2 and 3. As suggested by the intuition, it is optimal to allocate a
larger share of the risk at time where risk aversion is lower. Combining these
observations allows us to write the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider a given pair (¯;R) and a twice di¤erentiable, increasing
and concave utility function u. An early resolution of uncertainty raises
initial consumption for any distribution of net wealth ez if and only if for all
z; bz; we have
u0(c¤¤2 (z)) · (1 ¡ c¤¤03 (bz))u0(c¤¤2 (bz)) + c¤¤03 (bz)¯Ru0(z ¡Rc¤¤2 (bz)); (32)
where c¤¤2 (:) is de…ned in (4) and c¤¤
0
3 (:) is de…ned by condition (31).
Notice …rst that the su¢ciency of (32) is immediately obtained by taking
its expectation with respect to z = ez, and with a constant bz such that
c¤¤2 (bz) = c¤2: It yields
Eu0(c¤¤2 (ez)) · (1 ¡ c¤¤03 (bz))u0(c¤2) + c¤¤03 (bz)¯REu0(ez ¡Rc¤2)
= u0(c¤2);
(33)
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where we used the …rst-order condition (2) for c¤2. This shows that the early
resolution of uncertainty reduces the marginal value of wealth if condition
(32) is satis…ed. The di¢cult part of the proof above was to show that this
condition is also necessary.
Keep in mind that we can interpret c¤¤2 (bz) as c¤2; the optimal consumption
at t = 2 without information. The necessary and su¢cient condition states
that, in each state of nature z; the marginal utility of optimal consump-
tion with information must be less than a weighted average of discounted
marginal utilities at date t = 2 and 3 without information. The discount rate
is ¯R, and the implicit probabilities are 1 ¡ c¤¤03 (bz) and c¤¤03 (bz). Again, it is
easy to get back the case ¯R = 1; since it implies c¤¤2 (z) = c¤¤3 (z) = z=(1+R)
and c¤¤03 = 1=(1 +R): In such a case, condition (32) is formally equivalent to
condition (12), which holds if and only if u0 is convex.
Our necessary and su¢cient condition is still complex, as it requires that
a bivariate function F (:; :) be nonpositive, with
F (z; bz) = u0(c¤¤2 (z)) ¡ (1 ¡ c¤¤03 (bz))u0(c¤¤2 (bz)) ¡ c¤¤03 (bz)¯Ru0(z ¡Rc¤¤2 (bz)):
(34)
By construction, we have that F (bz; bz) = F1(bz; bz) = 0: Thus, a necessary
condition is that F11(bz; bz) be nonpositive. After some manipulations, it can
be checked that this necessary condition is nothing else than condition (24),
the necessary and su¢cient condition for small risk on net wealth.
Because of the complexity of the necessary and su¢cient condition (32),
we now derive a simpler su¢cient condition from it. The necessary and su¢-
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cient condition requires that F (z; bz) be uniformly nonpositive. Our su¢cient
condition requires that F1(z; bz) has the same sign as bz¡ z; which is stronger
than necessary. Replacing u0(c¤¤2 (z)) by ¯Ru0(c¤¤3 (z)) in (34), we have
F1(z; bz) = ¯R hu00(z ¡Rc¤¤2 (z))c¤¤03 (z) ¡ u00(z ¡Rc¤¤2 (bz))c¤¤03 (bz)i : (35)
Suppose that the utility function belongs to the class of HARA utility func-
tions, with u0(c) = (´ + c=°)¡° . This family of functions gathers all familiar
utility functions as exponential, quadratic, power and logarithmic ones. As
it is well-known since Wilson (1968), all e¢cient risk-sharing rules are lin-
ear when the utility function belongs to the HARA class. This implies that
c¤¤03 (z) = c¤¤
0
3 (bz) and yields
F1(z; bz) = ¯R [u00(z ¡Rc¤¤2 (z)) ¡ u00(z ¡Rc¤¤2 (bz))] c¤¤03 (z): (36)
If z is larger than bz, c¤¤2 (z) is larger than c¤¤2 (bz) and
u00(z ¡Rc¤¤2 (z)) ¡ u00(z ¡Rc¤¤2 (bz)) · 0 (37)
for the subset of HARA functions that exhibit prudence, as is the case for
exponential, power and logarithmic functions. Therefore, F1(z; bz) is negative
when z > bz. Symmetrically, F1(z; bz) is positive when z < bz. Because
F (bz; bz) = 0; this is su¢cient for F to be uniformly nonpositive. Proposition
1 implies that an early resolution of uncertainty raises initial consumption.
From these computations, it is easy to check that prudence is also necessary
when the utility function is restricted to be in the HARA class.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that u is HARA. Then, an earlier resolution of un-
certainty raises initial consumption if and only if the consumer is prudent.
Notice that we don’t need to have any information about the values of ¯
and R to conclude the above statement in the HARA case. In spite of the
common use of the HARA assumption in macroeconomics and in …nance,
the empirical tests of this assumption are scarce in the literature. Guiso and
Paiella (2000) rejects it by using panel data of Italian households. But this
assumption is sustained by the casual observation that the level of the risk
free rate and the equity premium do not show any decreasing trend over the
past century in spite of the important growth of GDP per capita experienced
during the period.3
Recently, Blundell and Stoker (1999) considered the same three-period
framework to provide an approximate solution for optimal consumption choice
for preferences that display constant relative risk aversion, which is a spe-
cial case of HARA. They used this framework to derive the relation between
information and consumption. They gave numerical examples where risk
resolving earlier in one’s life leads to a lower initial consumption. Their nu-
merical results are thus a priori contradictory with Proposition 3. We now
explain why.
Suppose, as in Blundell-Stoker, that total income is made of three parts
y1; ey2 and ey3 , where income eyt is received in period t. The total future wealth
3In Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Treich (2001), we easily derive from Lemma 1 that prudence
together with either the concavity or the convexity of absolute risk tolerance is su¢cient
to sign the comparative statics analysis.
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is thus
ew = R2y1 +Rey2 + ey3:
To examine the e¤ect of the resolution of uncertainty, Blundell and Stoker
compare scenario 1 (ey2 = y + e"; ey3 = y) to scenario 2 (ey2 = y; ey3 = y + e");
with Ee" = 0. Obviously, the uncertainty is revealed earlier in scenario 1.
But there is a second e¤ect in the Blundell-Stoker model. The point is that
the ex ante distribution of total future wealth is not the same in the two
scenarios. By transferring the risk from period 3 to period 2, there is also
an increase in risk on wealth by a factor R > 1. In order to isolate the e¤ect
of an early information, it is crucial to let the prior distribution of aggre-
gate wealth unchanged. The e¤ect exhibited by the numerical simulations of
Blundell-Stoker is in fact a precautionary e¤ect: transferring uncertain in-
comes from date 3 to date 2 increases the aggregate future risk, which induces
prudent agents to raise their precautionary saving. Our work has shown that
Blundell and Stoker would have obtained the opposite result if they would
have selected a su¢ciently smaller risk free rate.
6 Conclusion
Because labour income risks cannot be insured, workers must accumulate
precautionary savings. But risks that are resolved early in their life cycle can
be self-insured through time diversi…cation. Time diversi…cation is the mech-
anism by which large risks on wealth are disseminated into small variations
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in consumption over the entire lifetime from the date at which these risks are
realized. It is a substitute to market insurance. As a consequence, the ability
of workers to transfer uninsurable risks through time by an e¢cient contin-
gent saving/borrowing strategy should reduce their precautionary savings ex
ante. Because this mechanism works better when the resolution of the uncer-
tainty arises earlier in life, any earlier resolution of uncertainty should induce
consumers to reduce their initial savings. We showed in this paper that this
intuition is sustained by the theory at least in two special cases. An early
resolution of uncertainty reduces the initial saving of prudent consumers if
either their utility function exhibits HARA, or if the rate of pure preference
for the present equals the risk free rate.
We considered the simplest model that allowed us to examine the rela-
tionship between the timing of the resolution of uncertainty and savings. Of
course, it is too simple to examine more empirical questions. Interested read-
ers should rely on the existing literature in which the classical life cycle model
is calibrated with various stochastic income processes. Several extensions of
this theoretical work can be considered. For example, we limited the analysis
to the perfect resolution of uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty is fully elimi-
nated either at date 1 or at date 2. In Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Treich (2001),
we show that our results are not robust to the introduction of a partial reso-
lution of uncertainty. One should also introduce a liquidity constraint for the
sake of realism. Finally, one could reinterpret our model as the description
of a consumption-saving problem in which the consumer does not know the
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shape of their future preferences. In our additive model, the date-2 utility
function takes the form v(:; y) = u(:+ y); where y is some parameter whose
value would be unknown at date 0. A possible extension of this work would
be to consider more general functional forms for v, as considered for example
by Ando, Guiso and Terlizzese (1994).
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